Join in! The following is the first portion of a complaint being filed with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. It lays out the history of the ethnic problems which have lead to the current attack on a sovereign nation by the US government, and it’s NATO allies. It is well worth the reading, and will probably give you more insight than all of the establishment papers have published, to date.* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE THE PROSECUTOR OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
COMPLAINT
CHARGING
NATO’s political and military leaders and all responsible NATO personnel
WITH GRAVE BREACHES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949
And
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR
ATHENS, May 3, 1999
1. BRIEF HISTORY
1.1 The highlands of Kosovo have been the locus of tensions between Albanians and Serbs for centuries and like most of the Balkans, much blood has been shed over this territory. Albanians rely on their so-called ancient heritage to claim first rights to the region, whereas, Serbia focuses on the middle ages when Kosovo was the cradle of the Serb nation and the religious epicenter of the Serb Orthodox faith as evidenced by the approximately one thousand monasteries in the region. The mountains of Kosovo have determinative cultural and historical significance for the Serbs, as they staged the final battleground in 1389 between the Serbs and the Ottoman Turks. After the Serb defeat in Kosovo, the Ottoman continued their successful campaign into central Europe.
1.2 During the Ottoman occupation, the vast majority of Albanians readily converted to Islam and were thus afforded preferential treatment by the Turks. In the almost five centuries of Ottoman occupation of Kosovo, Muslim Albanians were encouraged to immigrate to Kosovo and settle in the area at the expense of the Serb population. The Serbs finally liberated Kosovo from the Ottoman Empire in 1912, and as expected, this liberation was accompanied by reprisals and the expulsion of the Albanian settlers who had been previously patronized by the Ottomans. The First World War presented the Albanians with an opportunity to exact reprisals, which the Serbs returned upon liberation in 1918. During the inter war period, the population in Kosovo was equally balanced between ethnic Albanians and Serbs.
1.3 During World War II, the majority of Kosovo was swallowed by a Greater Albania under Italian tutelage, while the remainder was occupied by Germany and Bulgaria. Over 300,000 Serbs were expelled from Kosovo during the Italian occupation, while Albanian immigration to Kosovo was encouraged by the occupation forces. Following Tito’s liberation of Yugoslavia, Kosovo was absorbed into the Republic of Yugoslavia, much to the chagrin of the Albanian community who had hoped for union with Albania. The Tito regime, however, did not favor the Serbs in the area. Tito’s communists did not allow the Serbs, expelled during the Italian occupation, to return and claim their property in Kosovo. In 1974, Tito granted Kosovo full autonomy. The period between 1975 and 1981 can be characterized as the "Albanian Spring" in Kosovo. Due to an exploding birthrate amongst the Albanians and Serb emigration, encouraged by the Tito regime, the Albanian population was rapidly becoming a majority in the 1980s. Once the Serbs had emigrated from the area, they were frequently barred from returning by the Communist regime.
1.4 By 1987, Albanians represented a 90% majority in the region. Serb demonstrations against Albanian harassment began to escalate. In response, Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy in 1989. These chain of events resulted in strikes and violent clashes between the Serb Police Force and Albanian demonstrators. Milosevic sent the military into Kosovo to reestablish control. In 1991, Albanian separatist, prompted by neighboring Albania, declared Kosovo an independent nation, fueling tension further. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was forged in 1996, out of various armed, terrorist, Albanian groups and a wide-spread campaign of terror commenced against the Serb police forces and civilians.
1.5 In the fighting that ensued between Serb forces and the KLA, an increasing number of Albanians abandoned the non-violent policies of their elected leader Ibrahim Rugova and began to join the terrorist KLA. By 1998 the KLA is said to have assumed control of 40% of Kosovo and a full scale guerrilla war was in progress. The KLA was financed and accoutered by outside sources with over 30,000 automatic rifles, antitank and other weaponry and sheltered by the indigenous Albanian community. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) ordered an offensive against the KLA in May of 1998. By August 1998, the FRY army had reestablished control over Kosovo and the KLA had retreated. The Yugoslav Government took measures against the Albanian civilians who had previously sheltered the KLA aimed to eradicate support for the terrorist organization. It must be noted that none of the parties involved in this Kosovo crisis demonstrated much regard for international humanitarian law. Civil rights and humanitarian concerns are usually the first casualties of a civil war, and Kosovo was no exception.
1.6 The international community became concerned with the escalating violence in the area. The Security Council enacted Resolution 1160/98, condemning the excessive use of force by Serbian Police forces against civilians in Kosovo, as well as acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army. Exercising its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council called upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to withdraw its special police forces from Kosovo and enter into a constructive dialogue with the indigenous Albanian community to advance a greater degree of autonomy and self-determination for the Kosvar Albanians within the framework of the Yugoslav state The Kosovo Albanian leadership was concurrently urged to condemn all terrorist activities and pursue their goals through peaceful means.
1.7 With Security Council Resolution 1199/98, the Security Council affirmed that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo represented "a threat to peace and security in the region." Once again exercising its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council demanded a cease fire to enhance the prospect of constructive dialogue between the Kosovo Albanian leadership and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and avert a potential risk of humanitarian catastrophe. The resolution also contained a caveat that in the event that the parties failed to implement the measures demanded in Resolution 1160, further measures would be taken to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region.
1.8 Under the unlawful threat of NATO air strikes, Milosevic was persuaded by US envoy, Richard Holbrooke, to execute two agreements in October 1998. The October 16, 1998 agreement provided for the stationing of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) civilian mission in Kosovo to verify Serb compliance with the above UN Resolutions, while the October 15, 1998 agreement stipulated that NATO would establish an air surveillance campaign over Kosovo to complement the OSCE verification mission.
1.9 With Resolution 1203/98, the Security Council endorsed and demanded the implementation of the verification missions provided by the October 1998 agreements as well as the measures called for by the previous resolutions. It also reaffirmed that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo represented "a threat to peace and security in the region."
1.10 In February, Ministers of the Contact Group met in Rambouillet with representatives of the Kosovo Albanians and the Government of the FRY to negotiate a political solution to the Kosovo crisis. The Contact Group presented the Kosovo Albanians and the Government of the FRY with a previously prepared draft agreement demanding a continued cease fire between the KLA and Serb forces, withdrawal of Serb forces and the grant of extensive autonomy for Kosovo within the framework of the Serbian state under a three year transitional period, with its future after that undetermined. The Contact Group proposed that this autonomy be monitored and secured through the stationing of a NATO "peace force." This "peace" agreement was served on Milosevic as an ultimatum which he was asked to either accept or face the prospect of NATO air strikes. There were no negotiations involved, nor an actual peace proposed. Yugoslavia had made it patently clear from the outset that it could not accept such an infringement on its sovereignty and thus from their inception, the Rambouillet "accord" was doomed to failure.
1.11 Although Milosevic was willing to agree to autonomy for Kosovo subject to a few amendments, he refused to sanction the stationing of NATO troops to monitor the agreement. The stationing of NATO’s troops in Kosovo represented an impermissible infringement of Yugoslav sovereignty. Following the March 15 continuation of the Rambouillet talks in Paris, it became apparent that the parties had reached a stalemate and that no agreement would be reached.
1.12 On March 23, 1999, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, upon instruction from the political leadership of NATO member nations, ordered air strikes against Yugoslavia, under the direction of Commander General Wesley Clark and other senior military NATO personnel. The justification offered for these air strikes was that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had failed to meet the international community demands, being the acceptance of the interim political settlement "negotiated" in Rambouillet, full observance of limits on the Serb army and special police force agreed on October 25th, and "an end to the excessive and disproportionate use of force in Kosovo." Solana further stated that this military action was intended to "support the political aims of the international community", "by weakening the ability of the Serb forces" "to cause further humanitarian catastrophes."
1.13 Thus started a NATO sponsored humanitarian catastrophe, aimed to prevent "further humanitarian catastrophe." To "end the excessive and disproportionate use of force in Kosovo", Secretary General Javier Solana unleashed the far superior, collective, military might of NATO and ordered an excessive and disproportionate use of force against Yugoslavia intended to destroy the vastly inferior Serb military force as well as the civilian infrastructure and environment for generations to come. To end this local, internal humanitarian crisis and preserve "international peace and security", NATO undermined the most fundamental tenets of international law founded on the cornerstones of non-intervention and sovereignty, as well as the prohibition against the unauthorized threat or use of force -- principles which have served the international community well for the last fifty odd years, to preserve international peace and security and prevent global wars. The lessons drawn by the Kosovo crisis, is that secessionist groups all over the world may rattle their terrorist saber in one hand and wave the humanitarian banner in the other, to attack the sovereignty of nations. The abuse of these principles of international law threaten us all, for inherent is the threat of a redefinition of borders, which, more frequently than not, is accompanied by the outbreak of war.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The remainder of the complaint can be found at
NATO War Crimes
